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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a Confrontation Clause case. This case presents the Court with a novel issue: 
how to interpret existing Idaho law regarding the use as substantive evidence of preliminary 
hearing testimony of an unavailable witness at a criminal trial in light of the United States 
Supreme Court's watershed reinvigoration of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 
S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). 
Course of the Proceedings in the Trial Below, Its Disposition, and Concise Statement of Facts 
Defendant Tim Carl Mantz was charged by criminal complaint with the felony crime of 
aggravated assault, Idaho Code§§ 18-901, 18-905, and 18-906. R. Vol. I, p. 22. Mr. Mantz 
was accused of intentionally firing a handgun near the head of alleged victim Karl A. Hoidal. 
Id. At the preliminary hearing, Mr. Hoidal testified and was cross-examined by defense 
counsel. R. Vol. I, p. 48. Mr. Mantz was bound over to District Court. R. Vol. I, pp. 52, 58. 
The criminal information upon which Mr. Mantz was tried alleged both aggravated assault and 
a sentencing enhancement. R. Vol. I, pp. 59-60. Before trial, Mr. Hoidal died in an unrelated 
accident and was therefore unavailable to testify at trial. R. Vol. I, p. 157. 
The State moved the District Court in limine to introduce at trial the preliminary 
hearing testimony of Mr. Hoidal. R. Vol. I, p. 157. The State's position was that the evidence 
was crucial to the State's case and that without the preliminary hearing testimony of Mr. Hoidal 
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the State's case would have been "eviscerated," R. Vol. I, p. 162, because no witness other than 
Mr. Hoidal could testify to personally observing Mr. Mantz during the alleged act of assault. R. 
Vol. I, p. 165. This position is consistent with the evidence produced at the multi-day jury trial. 
Mr. Mantz opposed the introduction of Mr. Hoidal 's preliminary hearing at trial based 
upon the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13, of the 
Idaho Constitution (R. Vol. I, pp. 184-202), and Mr. Mantz moved the District Court in limine 
to exclude the preliminary hearing testimony of Mr. Hoidal under the same authorities. 
R. Vol. I, p. 204. 
The District Court admitted the preliminary hearing testimony of Mr. Hoidal pursuant 
to LC.§ 9-336(3), l.R.E. 804(b)(l), and State v. Ricks, 122 Idaho 856,861, 840 P.2d 400,405 
(Ct.App. 1992). R. Vol. II, pp. 252-253. Mr. Hoidal's preliminary hearing testimony was 
presented to the jury by audio recording and written transcript during the State's case in chief at 
the jury trial. Tr. Vol. VI, p. 412, L. 14. Mr. Mantz was convicted. R. Vol. II, p. 366. He now 
appeals. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution prohibits the State from introducing into evidence in its case in chief at a 
criminal trial the preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness. 
2. Whether Article I, Section 13, of the Idaho Constitution prohibits the State from 
introducing into evidence in its case in chief at a criminal trial the preliminary hearing 
testimony of an unavailable witness. 
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A. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution prohibits the State from introducing into evidence in its case in 
chief at a criminal trial the preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable 
witness 
Introduction 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused has a right, guaranteed by the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, "to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him." U.S. Const.,Amdt. 6; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,406, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 
L.Ed.2d 923 (1965) (applying Sixth Amendment to the States). Formerly, the determination of 
when statements admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule also satisfy the 
Confrontation Clause was made under the framework articulated in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 
56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). Under Roberts, the prosecution generally had to 
first show the unavailability of the declarant of the out-of-court statement; once the prosecution 
had established unavailability, it then had to demonstrate that the statement bore adequate 
indicia of reliability. Id. at 66. Reliability was established only where (1) the evidence fell 
within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception," or (2) the statement carried "'particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness' such that adversarial testing would be expected to add little, if 
anything, to [its] reliability." Id. 
In 2004, the Supreme Court revisited its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence in 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). The Crawford 
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court definitively held that where "testimonial" hearsay is at issue, the Confrontation Clause 
demands that it be admitted for use against the defendant only when there exists both (1) 
unavailability of the declarant and (2) a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Id. at 68. The 
Court declined to articulate a comprehensive definition of "testimonial," but stated that it 
applies "at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a 
former trial; and to police interrogations." Id. (italics added). The Court concluded, "[w]here 
testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicum of reliability to satisfy constitutional 
demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation." Id. at 69. 
In Crawford, the defendant was charged with assault and attempted murder after 
stabbing victim Lee at Lee's apartment. Id. at 38-40. Defendant's wife Sylvia was present 
during the assault. Id. Police arrested the defendant and Sylvia, and both gave tape-recorded 
statements. Id. Their statements differed in one crucial respect: The defendant indicated that 
Lee may have had something in his hand as the defendant stabbed him, but Sylvia indicated 
that Lee may have reached for something only after he was stabbed. Id. At trial, the defendant 
claimed self-defense and invoked Washington's marital privilege to prevent Sylvia from 
testifying against him. Id. at 40. The state introduced Sylvia's tape-recorded confession under 
the state's against-penal-interest exception to the hearsay rule, and the jury convicted. Id. at 
40-41. 
The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the conviction; on subsequent appeal, the 
Washington Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, finding that Sylvia's confession was 
sufficiently reliable to satisfy the Confrontation Clause because it interlocked with the 
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defendant's confession. Id. at 41. The U.S. Supreme Court sidestepped the question of whether 
the Confrontation Clause permits the admission against a criminal defendant of an accomplice 
statement on the grounds that it interlocks with the defendant's statement, and instead 
conducted a wholesale reevaluation of its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. 
In considering whether to reevaluate the longstanding Confrontation Clause framework 
established in Roberts, the Court undertook a lengthy historical analysis of the common law 
confrontation right. Id. at 42 (citations omitted). The Court reached two conclusions. First, the 
Confrontation Clause was directed at prohibiting the "use of ex parte examinations as evidence 
against the accused." Id. In the 16th and 17th centuries,judicial officials would routinely 
conduct private examinations of witnesses, and the examinations would be read into evidence 
against the accused at trial, despite demands by the accused for an opportunity to confront the 
absent accusers. See id. at 43-44. Under the Court's analysis, this history supported a second 
conclusion: The Framers "would not have allowed admission of testimonial statements of a 
witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had 
had a prior opportunity for cross-examination." Id. at 53-54. 
In overruling Roberts, the Court explained that the Clause provides a procedural, not a 
substantive, guarantee. Id. at 61. "It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability 
be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination." Id. The 
Court did not set forth a standard for the type of cross-examination that would satisfy the 
Clause, but other states have addressed this issue subsequent to the Crawford decision. 
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B. The type of cross-examination afforded a criminal defendant at a preliminary hearing in 
the State of Idaho is inadequate to satisfy the Confrontation Clause 
In State v. Stuart, 695 N .W. 2d 259 (Wisc. 2005), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held 
that introduction at trial of the preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness violated 
the defendant's right of confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and remanded the 
case for re-trial on the charge of first-degree murder. Three things are notable about the 
decision. First, because of Crawford's reinterpretation of the Confrontation Clause, the 
Wisconsin court reversed existing Wisconsin law allowing the introduction of preliminary 
hearing testimony, much as Mr. Mantz is asking this Court to do regarding existing Idaho law. 
Id. at 263. Second, the Wisconsin Attorney General agreed with the defendant that the use of 
the preliminary hearing testimony violated the defendant's right of confrontation, even though 
some cross-examination did occur at the defendant's preliminary hearing. Id. at 265,267. And 
third, in the rationale for its decision the Court detailed several inherent limitations of cross-
examinations which occur at preliminary hearings. Id. at 266,267. It is the rationale of the 
opinion, not the occurrence of the ruling, which should carry the greatest weight with this 
Comt. 
In Stuart, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder. Id. at 260. At the 
defendant's preliminary hearing, his brother testified against him and was cross-examined by 
defense counsel. Id. at 261,262. The brother was not available at trial because he refused to 
testify, asserting his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Id. at 262. In an 
interlocutory appeal during the trial, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the preliminary 
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hearing testimony was admissible. Id. at 263. The defendant's brother's preliminary hearing 
testimony was read into the record before the trial jury, and the defendant was convicted. Id. at 
263-264. 
Mr. Stuart's case came back before the Court on post-conviction proceedings, and in the 
intervening years between the interlocutory appeal and the post-conviction proceedings the 
United States Supreme Court decided Crawford. Id. at 264. In reversing existing Wisconsin 
law regarding the admissibility of preliminary hearing testimony, the Court explained that its 
earlier rulings were based in part on the subsequently overruled Confrontation Clause analysis 
set forth in Roberts. Id. at 256. "With the Crawford decision, a new day has dawned for 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence." Id. at 265, citing State v. Hale, 691 N .W.2d 637 (Wisc. 
2005). 
In holding that the limited opportunity for cross-examination afforded Mr. Stuart at his 
preliminary hearing was insufficient to satisfy the right to a prior opportunity for cross-
examination guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause as explained in Crawford, the Court's 
rationale included four factors applicable to all preliminary hearings. First, a preliminary 
hearing is necessarily limited in scope "because the preliminary hearing is intended to be a 
summary proceeding to determine essential or basic facts relating to probable cause, not a full 
evidentiary trial on the issue of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 266 (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). Second, the scope of cross-examination at a preliminary hearing 
is "limited to issues of plausibility, not credibility." Id. (citation omitted). Third, cross-
examination at a preliminary hearing is "not to be used for the purpose of exploring the general 
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trustworthiness of the witness." Id. at 266 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
And fourth, at the preliminary hearing Mr. Stuart was not allowed to cross-examine his brother 
about a possible motive to testify falsely. Id. at 267. The brother "had been facing criminal 
charges in 1998 when he gave his statements to police implicating Stuart in the death of [the 
victim]." Id. The Court explained this line of potential cross-examination with a quote from 
one of its earlier opinions: 
[The witness] may well have been testifying favorably to the state in the hope and 
expectation that the state would reward him by dropping or reducing pending 
charges. Even though that expectation were absurd, defense counsel had the right 
and duty to explore the witness' motives. When a witness has been criminally 
charged by the state, he is subject to the coercive power of the state and can also be 
the object of its leniency. The witness is aware of that fact, and it may well 
influence his testimony. 
Id. at 674 (citation omitted, brackets in original). 
Each of these four factors, that the scope of a preliminary hearing is naturally limited by 
its purpose, that cross-examination at a preliminary hearing generally does not focus on a 
witness's credibility, that cross-examination at a preliminary hearing generally does not focus 
on a witness's general trustworthiness, and that cross-examination at a preliminary hearing 
generally does not focus on a witness's motives for testifying falsely, is as applicable to 
preliminary hearings held in the State of Idaho as to preliminary hearings held in the State of 
Wisconsin. The last above quotation, which mentions defense counsel's "right and duty" is 
particularly noteworthy because the duties of defense counsel are so different in conducting 
cross-examination at trial as compared to a cross-examination at a preliminary hearing. Even if 
the time available for preliminary hearing cross-examination were unlimited, and even if full 
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discovery and investigation had been completed prior to the preliminary hearing, only the most 
ineffective and incompetent defense counsel would reveal his or her trial strategy to the 
prosecution, and tip off the witness to his impeachment strategy, by conducting the same cross-
examination at the preliminary hearing as had been planned for trial. Such a plan would be 
anathema to the experienced and competent practitioner. 
A more generalized rejection of preliminary hearing cross-examination as adequate 
cross-examination for Confrontation Clause purposes was set forth by the Supreme Court of 
Colorado in People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970 (Colo. 2004). The Court held, "[A]lthough a defendant 
must have been provided with a prior adequate opportunity to cross-examine an unavailable 
witness before the State can admit that witness's previous testimony into evidence, the 
preliminary hearing does not provide an adequate opportunity to cross-examine sufficient to 
satisfy the Confrontation Clause requirements." Id. at 978. 
A jury had convicted defendant Fry of second degree assault and second degree murder 
for the death of his girlfriend, which was caused by an impact to the head. Id. at 972-73. At 
the preliminary hearing the defendant's uncle testified that Mr. Fry had essentially confessed to 
him. Id. at 973. Defense counsel did not cross-examine Mr. Fry's uncle at the preliminary 
hearing, and he died before trial. Id. The preliminary hearing testimony of Mr. Fry's uncle was 
admitted at trial because the trial court found that it met the two-part test of unavailability and 
reliability as set forth in Roberts. Id. The defendant was convicted and then appealed. Id. The 
court of appeals in Colorado reversed and the state appealed. Id. During the pendency of the 
appeal, the United States Supreme Court decided Crawford, and the Supreme Court of 
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Colorado reviewed the case in light of that decision. Id. at 974. The Court reiterated a 
previous holding regarding the admissibility of preliminary hearing testimony (Id. at 978) and 
overruled its previous holdings which were dependent on a Roberts reliability analysis 
regarding the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 976. 
In reaching its blanket rejection of preliminary hearing cross-examination as adequate 
for purposes of the Confrontation Clause, the Court's rationale included six central reasons, 
two of which (the limited scope of a preliminary hearing and the limited focus on witness 
credibility at a preliminary hearing) overlap with the reasons expressed by the Supreme Court 
of Wisconsin in Stuart, supra. The remaining four reasons which add to the analysis of Stuart 
include principles of public policy and conservation of judicial resources as well as additional 
practical considerations regarding the conduct both of presiding judges at preliminary hearings 
and defense counsel at preliminary hearing. 
In explaining its rationale, the Supreme Court of Colorado first addressed the limited 
scope of a preliminary hearing. "A preliminary hearing is limited to matters necessary to a 
determination of probable cause." Fry at 977 (citation omitted). Second, the Court explained 
that a defendant at a preliminary hearing lacks a right to unrestricted cross-examination of the 
state's witnesses, and that, if in-depth cross-examination is attempted by defense counsel, it 
may be restricted by the presiding judge. 
A defendant has no constitutional right to unrestricted confrontation of witnesses 
and to introduce evidence at a preliminary hearing. By rule, defendants have the 
right to a preliminary hearing under certain circumstances, and pursuant to the rule a 
defendant may cross-examine witnesses against him and may introduce evidence in 
his own behalf. However, the preliminary hearing is not intended to be a mini-trial 
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or to afford the defendant an opportunity to effect discovery. Hence, a preliminary 
hearing does not provide the same safeguards as a trial. 
Id. at 977 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court explained this reason 
further. "[f]he right to cross-examination may be curtailed by the judge in all but the most 
unusual circumstances." Id. (citation omitted). Third, the Court touched on the same 
credibility limitation set forth in Stuart. "[f]he judge's findings at a preliminary hearing are 
restricted to a determination of probable cause. A judge may not engage in credibility 
determinations unless the testimony is incredible as a matter of law." Id. (citations omitted). 
The Court expanded on this reason by stating, "Aside from the exceptionally rare instance of 
credibility as an issue of law, defense counsel has no legitimate motive to engage in credibility 
inquiries and may be prohibited from doing so." Id. (citation omitted). "Further, the 
opportunity for cross-examination regarding the credibility of a witness, as a matter of fact, 
exists only to the extent that an attorney persists in asking questions that have no bearing on the 
issues before the court, and such irrelevant questioning is not prohibited by the court." Id. 
This recognition of the motives of defense counsel at a preliminary hearing led the 
Court to its fourth reason for holding that preliminary hearing testimony is inadequate for 
Confrontation Clause purposes: that in practice defense counsel may decline to question 
prosecution witnesses at a preliminary hearing. 
Because credibility is not at issue and probable cause is a low standard, once a 
prima facie case for probable cause is established, there is little defense counsel can 
do to show that probable cause does not exist. Therefore, as a practical matter, 
defense counsel may decline to cross-examine witnesses at the preliminary hearing, 
understanding that the cross-examination would have no bearing on the issue of 
probable cause and that the judge may limit or prohibit the cross-examination. 
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Id. at 977. The same reason is applicable to limited questioning by defense counsel at cross-
examination at a preliminary hearing in the State of Idaho. 
The Court next focused on the importance of cross-examination occurring in the 
presence of the jury so that the jury may view the reaction of the witness as he or she endures 
the ordeal of in-trial cross-examination. "The right to confrontation is basically a trial right. It 
includes both the opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion for the jury to weigh the 
demeanor of the witness." Id. at 978 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
"[f]estimony is much more reliable when it is given under oath at trial where the witness can 
be cross-examined and the jury may observe the witness's demeanor." Id. at 975 (citation 
omitted). 
A skilled cross-examiner can confront a dishonest witness, or a witness who is 
mistaken, with questions that cause the witness to see the corner he has painted 
himself into and react in a way that permits the jury to judge credibility from what it 
hears and sees. Thus, a witness's testimony on cross-examination may be much 
more damning to the witness's credibility than any sort of indirect evidence the 
defense can offer. In sum, the opportunity for cross-examination is without equal as 
a tool in the search for truth. 
Id. at 980. See also U.S. v. Yida, 498 F.3d 945, 950 (CA9 2007) ("Underlying both the 
constitutional principles and the rules of evidence is a preference for live testimony. Live 
testimony gives the jury ( or other trier of fact) the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the 
witness while testifying .... Transcripts of a witness's prior testimony, even when subject to 
prior cross-examination, do not offer any such advantage, because all persons must appear 
alike, when their [testimony] is reduced to writing.") (Internal quotation marks and citations 
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omitted.) The importance of a jury's view of a witness during his testimony, and the critical 
practical distinction between reading a witness's words and watching him testify, was also 
explained by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Government of the 
Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540 (3 rd Cir. 1967): 
Demeanor is of the utmost importance in determination of the credibility of a 
witness. The innumerable telltale indications which fall from a witness during the 
course of his examination are often much more of an indication to judge or jury of 
his credibility and the reliability of his evidence than is the literal meaning of his 
words. Even beyond the precise words themselves lies the unexpressed indication 
of his alignment with one side or the other in the trial. It is indeed rarely that a 
cross-examiner succeeds in compelling a witness to retract testimony which is 
harmful to his client, but it is not infrequently that he leads a hostile witness to 
reveal by his demeanor - his tone of voice, the evidence of fear which grips him at 
the height of cross-examination, or even his defiance that his evidence is not to be 
accepted as true, either because of partiality or overzealousness or inaccuracy, as 
well as outright untruthfulness. The demeanor of a witness, as Judge Frank said, is 
"wordless language." 
Id. at 548, citing Broadcast Music, Inc., v. Havana Madrid Restaurant Corp., 175 F.2d 77, 80 
(2nd Cir. 1949). This distinction between the words spoken by a witness on cross-examination 
and the message conveyed to the jury through the witness's body language, facial expressions, 
and other wordless cues is well known to trial lawyers. This Court should call upon its 
collective trial experience in weighing the great significance of this rationale. Most trial 
lawyers go many years or even entire careers without causing a "Perry Mason moment" in trial 
in which the witness capitulates and changes his story under cross-examination. On the other 
hand it is a frequent occurrence for a trial lawyer to cause a witness to reveal some bias or 
motivation on cross-examination through the non-verbal cues detailed above. 
Finally in Fry, the Supreme Court of Colorado turned to the public policy ramifications 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF: PAGE 16 OF 24 
I 
I 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
of its holding. 
[The holding] prevents the preliminary hearing from becoming a mini-trial which 
would expend time and resources the judiciary does not possess. Changing the 
purpose of these hearings would impact all criminal cases, not just those with 
Confrontation Clause issues. Preliminary hearings are limited to a determination of 
probable cause so that they do not become mini-trials. Were we to allow extensive 
cross-examination by defense counsel so as to prevent any Confrontation Clause 
violations at trial if a witness were to become unavailable, we would turn the 
preliminary hearing in every case into a much longer and more burdensome process 
for all parties involved. Therefore, we do not expand the scope of preliminary 
hearings in order to allow them to satisfy Confrontation Clause requirements. 
Id. at 978. This public policy rationale is as applicable to the State of Idaho as to the State of 
Colorado, as are the other Fry factors. Now that Confrontation Clause analysis has been 
shifted by the United States Supreme Court away from the reliability test of Roberts to a cross-
examination test under Crawford, a holding by this Court that preliminary hearing cross-
examination is sufficient to meet Confrontation Clause requirements set by Crawford would 
have the natural consequence of lengthening preliminary hearings across the State of Idaho as 
well as diminishing the number of waivers of preliminary hearings by defendants. 
An application of Crawford to a situation analogous to the preliminary hearing context 
occurred in State v. Lopez, 974 So.2d 340 (Fla. 2008). The Supreme Court of Florida held that 
a discovery deposition did not satisfy the opportunity for cross-examination required by the 
Confrontation Clause under Crawford. Part of the Court's reasoning is applicable to cross-
examinations at preliminary hearings in the State of Idaho. "A defendant cannot be expected to 
conduct an adequate cross-examination as to matters of which he first gained knowledge at the 
deposition. This is especially true if the defendant is unaware that this deposition would be the 
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only opportunity he would have to examine and challenge the accuracy of the deponent's 
statements." Id. at 350 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As in the discovery 
deposition in Lopez, an Idaho defense counsel does not ordinarily prepare for a preliminary 
hearing in the expectation that it will be his or her one and only opportunity to examine the 
witness, and counsel cannot adequately conduct cross-examination as to matters first revealed 
in the preliminary hearing. Because preliminary hearings usually occur early in a proceeding, 
discovery and investigation are typically far from completed. 
C. The introduction at trial of Karl Hoidal 's preliminary hearing testimony denied Mr. 
Mantz the right of confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment 
In Mr. Mantz's case, the first inquiry under Crawford is whether Mr. Hoidal's 
preliminary hearing testimony was "testimonial" for purposes of Sixth Amendment analysis. 
Crawford explicitly categorizes preliminary hearing testimony as testimonial. Crawford, 
supra, at 68. Having passed this threshold test, we next apply Crawford's two-part test of (1) 
unavailability and (2) opportunity to cross-examine. It cannot reasonably be disputed that Mr. 
Hoidal was unavailable because he died after the preliminary hearing and before trial. 
Therefore, the focus of the constitutional analysis in this case, and the focus of this appeal, is 
on whether Mr. Mantz had an opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Hoidal in a manner adequate 
under Crawford. Of the authorities relied upon by the District Court in its ruling, l.C. § 
9-336(3), I.R.E. 804(b)(l), and State v. Ricks, 122 Idaho 856,840 P.2d 400 (Ct.App. 1992), R. 
Vol. II, pp. 252-253, both the statute and the rule are subject to the additional Sixth Amendment 
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guarantees as set forth in Crawford, and Ricks has been abrogated by Crawford because of the 
Ricks opinion's reliance on Roberts. See Ricks, 122 Idaho at 860,840 P.2d at 404. 
From the above-cited authorities and the application of reason to the conduct of 
preliminary hearings in Idaho, the rationale for rejecting preliminary hearing cross-
examinations as adequate for purposes of the Confrontation Clause can be synthesized into the 
following eight principles. 
1. A preliminary hearing is by its nature and purpose limited in scope. It is a probable 
cause determination (I.C.R. 5.l(b)), not a mini-trial. 
2. The scope of cross-examination at a preliminary hearing is focused on plausibility, 
not credibility, because the standard of proof for binding over the defendant -
probable cause - is so low. 
3. The scope of cross-examination at a preliminary hearing does not encompass the 
general trustworthiness of the witness because such a showing would be insufficient 
to prevent the defendant from being bound over, again because the standard of proof 
is so low. 
4. The scope of cross-examination at a preliminary hearing generally excludes inquiry 
into the witness's motives to testify falsely or to shade his testimony in favor of the 
prosecution, because such a showing would be irrelevant to the magistrate's 
determination of probable case, would reveal defense trial strategy to the 
prosecution, and would prepare the witness for the cross-examination to come at 
trial. 
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4 experience of lawyers in Idaho that different magistrates in different jurisdictions 
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21 cross-examination to meet Confrontation Clause requirements. Common 
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experience across the State of Idaho is that many preliminary hearings are either 
very brief or are waived altogether. If this Court were to rule that preliminary 
hearing cross-examination must substitute for trial cross-examination, the judicial 
system could be significantly burdened to the detriment of all cases by defendants 
insisting on both the occurrence of a preliminary hearing and also on more 
extensive cross-examination to meet Crawford requirements. Defense counsel did 
not have this motivation pre-Crawford because the Roberts test centered on a 
judicial determination of reliability, not the procedural guarantee of cross-
examination. 
This last factor, public policy, leads to the best method for deciding the case at bar. In 
the interest of public policy, this Court should set a bright line rule, as did the Supreme Court of 
Colorado in Fry, that preliminary hearing cross-examination is always insufficient to pass 
Constitutional muster. The same result in this case, reversal of the conviction, could be reached 
by an analysis of the particulars of Mr. Mantz's preliminary hearing, but most of the eight 
principles discussed above apply equally to every preliminary hearing in every felony case in 
Idaho. If this Court fashions a vagne, multi-prong test, as did some of the progeny of Roberts 
for the determination of reliability, magistrates and defense counsel in the State of Idaho will 
not know what is expected of them at preliminary hearings. Defendants will face the Hobson's 
choice of revealing trial strategy at preliminary hearings through extensive trial-type cross-
examination of witnesses or preserving trial strategy and the element of surprise so important to 
most cross-examinations at the expense of potentially waiving the constitutional right to 
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confrontation. The result will be uncertainty, future litigation both in direct and post-conviction 
appeals, and a likely disparity in the type of preliminary hearing cross-examination afforded 
defendants by different magistrates across the State of Idaho. The better choice for this Court 
is to provide clear guidance to the lower courts in an already very busy judicial system. 
D. The error was not harmless 
If the introduction of Mr. Hoidal 's preliminary hearing testimony against Mr. Mantz 
were harmless error, then the State would likely argue that the conviction should not be 
reversed. This Court need not read the entire jury trial transcript to determine this issue 
because the State admitted in its pleadings to the District Court that the preliminary hearing 
evidence was "crucial" to the State's case and that without the preliminary hearing testimony of 
Mr. Hoidal the State's case would have been "eviscerated" (R. Vol. I, p. 162) because no 
witness other than Mr. Hoidal could testify to personally observing Mr. Mantz during the 
alleged act of assault. R. Vol. I, p. 165. "[T]he opportunity to impeach a witness is particularly 
important where the [prosecution's] entire case hinges upon the testimony of the unavailable 
witness." Commonwealth v. Smith, 647 A.2d 907, 913 (Pa.Super. 1994). 
II. 
Article I. Section 13, of the Idaho Constitution prohibits the State from 
introducing into evidence in its case in chief at a criminal trial the preliminary 
hearing testimony of an unavailable witness 
The United States Supreme Court's ruling in Crawford was a watershed event in 
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confrontation analysis. It overruled longstanding precedent regarding a defendant's rights at a 
criminal trial. For the reasons expressed in Crawford and in the above authorities, this Court 
should reinterpret Article I, Section 13, of the Idaho Constitution to provide the same or greater 
protection to accused persons as does the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
under Crawford. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should vacate Mr. Mantz's conviction and 
remand this case for a new trial. 
DATED this 4th day of February 2009. 
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